‘Mort pour la France’:
Coercion and Co-option of ‘Indochinese’
Worker-Soldiers in World War One

Geoffrey C. Gunn

Introduction
Faced with early setbacks in World War I battles on the Western Front, alongside a massive attrition of manpower, France began to look to its empire as sources of labour alongside soldiers. Eventually Indochina would supply some 30 per cent of France’s colonial forces alongside even larger contingents of Senegalese, Madagascans, and Moroccans and even, from outside the empire, Chinese. While the lion’s share of the ‘Indochinese’ were Vietnamese, Cambodians also made up one battalion. While the transformative and emotional experiences of the soldier (linh tho) – workers in France has been the subject of at least one dedicated study in English (Hill 2006; 2011a; 2011b), I am equally concerned with the objective experience of the Indochinese en route to the battlefields, their wartime actions, and intellectual responses. A horrible war by any standards, it was not surprising that many thousands of brave Vietnamese and Cambodians made the supreme sacrifice, or died for France (‘mort pour la France’) as written on their epitaphs if buried in France. Although stepping back from the broader issue of the intra-imperialist struggle surrounding the ‘Great War’, I am also concerned to link Indochinese participation in the war with the ‘anti-war’ and/or anti-colonial movement in Paris and at home.

In sequence, the article seeks; first, to examine labour and military recruitment at the source, including the special roles of the royal courts; second, to expose the actual role played by the Indochinese infantry battalions pressed into the trenches in the Somme as well as in the Balkans; third, to expose the contradictions posed by France’s patriotic appeal for ‘volunteers’ versus the anti-colonial movement at home; and, finally, to examine the juncture between the émigré worker-soldiers in France and the activities of the burgeoning socialist and communist underground in Paris and, back home, as best exemplified by the activities and writings of Ho Chi Minh including the now-famous petition he presented on 18 June 1919 at the Versailles Peace Conference, the international gathering that literally bookended the war.

In particular I have examined little known Journal de Marche et Opérations documents, in turn sourced to the French Service Historique de la Défense (SHD), Département de l’armée de Terre, to offer details on the outward journey of the conscripts to France, as well as their labour and frontline deployment in France and, in once case, in the Balkans. Taking
the form of a diary, it is possible to track each of the battles from their date of departure, arrival, deployment, service, and date of disbandment. Indispensable as possibly the only extant battalion-level documents relating to the actual work-combat experience of the Indochinese, the journals are nevertheless uneven in their composition, lacking on mobilisation-demobilisation details, shy on casualty rates, and sometimes too generalised to be of use. Written by French battalion commanders, the subaltern character of the Indochinese can be taken for granted, just as their voices are missing.

**General Mobilisation in Indochina / War Economy**

Up until the outbreak of the ‘Great War’ (1914–18), the total number of Indochinese immigrants in France scarcely exceeded several hundred. But as France turned to its colonial empire to defend itself in the wider war with Germany both at home and in the Balkans, the wave of soldier-workers arriving in France spiked in the 1915–1919 period to a figure of 42,922 tirailleurs (rifle company or infantry) and 49,180 workers (Brocheux 2012). They comprised together 15 infantry battalions and logistics formations. Among the latter were 9,019 male nurses and 5,339 clerical and administrative workers. Additionally, there were 48,981 civilian workers divided between specialists and non-specialists assigned to 129 metropolitan establishments. By origin, the 93,411 worker-soldier (practically all male) hailed from, respectively, Tonkin or northern Vietnam with some 24 per cent, Annam or central Vietnam, 32 per cent, and with Cochinchina or southern Vietnam, and Cambodia, equally divided with around 22 per cent share (Rives 2013).

The physical mechanised war that bled the industrialised nations of their physical resources in the production of munitions and weapons of destruction was no less a war for resources calling upon global (read imperial) supply networks to feed metropolitan industry and to succor its armies. As with the British empire, so the French looked upon its colonies for these resources. Notably, on 8 August 1914, Paris decreed all exports of cereals and cattle from Indochina forbidden with the exception of markets in France, England, the Netherlands Indies, Japan, Russia and other French or Allied colonies (ANC 15765 Correspondences concernant la guerre... 1914–18, Gouverneur Général Indochine, 8 August 1914). In other words, trade with Allies was sanctioned while trade with the German enemy was foreclosed.

In an order of 6 November 1914, repeated 28 March 1915, the French military in Indochina made preparations for a general mobilisation. Simultaneously, a ‘state of siege’ was declared in Cochinchina, administered directly as a colony, and in Tonkin. Order went out from the Ministry of War to register all French males in residence in Cochinchina as well as in Cambodia with a view to mobilisation. This was accomplished with respect to those employed in government services according to department. Certain fell through the cracks but were still liable for conscription. As of 18 September, 1914, all reservists and French citizens up to the age of 46 were called up. Alongside the regulatory character of the mobilisation, the patriotism of the French was also called upon. In theory, the general mobilization of French officials should have created vacancies for locals, as with the case of a French teacher at the Pursat school in Cambodia withdrawn for service, although that cannot have been a generalised practice (ANC 15765 Correspondences concernant la guerre... 1914–18, Saigon, November 1914; Kompong Chhang, 30 March 1915). There is no evidence of anti-war opposition on the part of French in Indochina and, as with metropolitan French, most were initially stirred by patriotism.

It should be understood that having invaded Vietnam in stages, France also began to raise loyal battalions, acting as auxiliaries in a version of colonial divide and rule against ongoing rebellions, not only in Vietnam, but also in Cambodia and Laos. From May 1900, Vietnamese auxiliaries also served with French forces in the Boxer Rebellion including Vietnamese sailors in service with the French navy (five warships). Not all returned home alive. Some 20 Vietnamese sailors killed in the Boxer Rebellion alongside French officers are buried in one of Nagasaki’s international cemeteries, still extant.

**Mobilisation of Indigenous Populations**

Alongside the mobilisation of French citizens, the colonial administration also sought to tap reserves of indigenous manpower, including reservists. Winning over the native population in Indochina was carried out on a number of levels, from conscription, to persuasion, to inducements, to deception. Officialised Vietnamese histories are unambiguous in asserting the forced nature of wartime recruitment of soldier-workers, facts repeated in a number of non-communist histories (eg. Marr 1971, pp. 229–30). Contrariwise, Kimloan Hill (2011a, p. 55) has argued that most recruits in fact volunteered, allowing only isolated incidents in which individuals were coerced ‘not a general narrative of mass conscription’. She thus falls in line with the general argument made by French military historian Colonel Rives who highlights the attraction of metropolitan France for the Indochinese in search of adventure as well as new skills. As evidence of pull factors, Hill mentions that the Imperial Court of Hue offered 200 francs to each ‘volunteer’ who passed a physical examination. Other inducements included bonuses, family allowances and most importantly remission from the compulsory and despised body tax. The recruits also received a base pay of 0.75 francs a day, rising with seniority. As she claims, a package arrangement including bonuses, wages, pensions and family allowances is just not consistent with out-and-out conscription (Hill 2006, p. 259).

In the absence of village-level documentation this conundrum is difficult to answer. First, we must acknowledge the role of the royal houses along
with pro-French mandarins in the recruitment of, respectively, natives of Cambodia and those coming under the jurisdiction of the Court of Hue in Annam, both 'protectorates' in the French Indochina set-up. We must also acknowledge government control over information and pro-France-anti-German propaganda. Recruitment posters promised prosperity and racial equality. According to military historian Rives (2013), to facilitate recruitment, propaganda films playing up the lavish lifestyle of the 'volunteers' in France were shown at the village level. Posters appeared in all the major towns offering an image of a sharpshooter pointing out to a crouched peasant all the material benefits of recruitment.

Hill (2006) also allows for push factors favoring recruitment as with hardships stemming from the floods of 1913–15 in northern Vietnam, along with drought and rural banditry in central Vietnam and here I am in agreement. For the indigent landless Vietnamese, especially from the overcrowded northern delta and the marginal and poverty-stricken central Vietnam coastal region, there was every reason to move out, just as future generations would be lured into the mining camps of Laos and northern Vietnam, or as plantation labour in the south or even overseas, more often than not in deplorable conditions and with high mortality. But all labour recruitment in colonial Vietnam was a mix of inducements and pressure and we can expect that wartime labour recruitment was no exception. Undoubtedly, to use the expression of Tobias Rettig (2005), these were 'contested loyalties'.

Cambodian Princes

In Cambodia, the patriotism of the royal family was placed on line to induce the conscription of their unlettered subjects or country cousins. With the permission of King Sisowath Monivong (r. 1904–27), seven royal princes were inducted into the 20th Batallion de Tirailleurs Indochoinois (BTT) for service in France, three of them actively recruited by the king. Notionally, the princes accepted the same conditions as their fellows but were also granted special allowances, as with subventions to provide for their families in their absence. King Sisowath himself signed off on a royal ordinance declining the 'voluntary' action of the princes in joining the 20th Battalion 'for the war in France' (ANC 10421 Princes engagés au 20 Batallion Indochoinois, 28 October 1916). In fact, such members of the royal family as the crown prince Sisowath Monivong, a graduate of the Saint-Maixent military academy and a second lieutenant in the Foreign Legion, actively engaged in the recruitment of Cambodians for the World War I effort.

Undoubtedly, in a protectorate of highly restricted literacy matched by information control, recruitment of Cambodians for the 'war in France' proceeded more easily with the royal volunteers stepping into the breach. At the moment of their departure for France from Saigon port, the Cambodian volunteers were offered a 'spectacular' official salute. Practically, the first Cambodians to set foot on a ship, much less leave their natal provinces, their lives would never be quite the same again.

Certain Indochinese who had been students in France or Algeria were actually inducted directly into metropolitan units as subjects of France and only subsequently admitted to the BTT. Among them were the Cambodian princes Pinoret et Watchayvong along with the Vietnamese, Nguyên Ba Luan. They were joined by students from trade and professional schools in Aix-en-Provence and Angers (Rives 2013).

The Journey

Depending upon place of recruitment, as exposed by Journal de Marche documents, the soldier-worker battalions departed from Haiphong, Danang, and Saigon, variously north, central and southern Vietnam. Dubbed 'Indochinese', especially as 'Vietnamese' did not enter French vocabulary until after the August Revolution of 1945, the French were also careful to maintain the cohesion of these regionally recruited battalions. Ships departing from northern ports invariably staged at Saigon before embarking upon the long journey to France. Typically the ships would bunker at Singapore, Penang in some cases, Colombo, Aden, Suez, and one or two Mediterranean ports prior to arrival in Marseilles. One variation was a stage at Diego Suarez on Madagascar. Another was at Djibouti. Nevertheless, there were a number of variations upon the typical six week passage, either delayed departure or other circumstances en route.

Shipboard conditions, in the words of one analyst, were the first 'disillusionment' experienced by the travelers (Hill 2011a, p. 55). This is not only a reference to overcrowded conditions and poor food (at least one contingent rioted over this question even prior to departure in Haiphong) but illness and mortality. The case of the 13th Battalion, raised in northern Vietnam is illustrative. Departing Haiphong on 29 March 1916 on the SS Amazone, an outbreak of cholera forced a disembarkation and the quarantining of the battalion in Saigon. Obliged to continue their journey aboard the SS Pai Ho, the 13th Battalion, now numbering 1,023, were accommodated alongside 1,044 workers in atrocious conditions. No sooner had the vessel departed Saigon/Vung Tau for the long voyage to Marseilles than health problems were encountered, especially stemming from overcrowding. As temperatures in the South China Sea reached over 40 degrees centigrade in the lower decks, latrines failed as did the kitchens which simply could not cope. Just prior to arrival in Colombo, two riflemen succumbed from cholera and the ship was placed in quarantine. Entering the Red Sea on 17 May in intense heat, more deaths from cholera were encountered with dysentery making an appearance. Arriving in Suez with the number of deaths and illnesses spiking upwards, the situation reached crisis level, 'intolerable and dangerous for all', as recorded by the commanding officer.
In desperation, at least two Vietnamese jumped overboard. By this stage, 100 deaths had been recorded since departing Saigon (9 tirailleurs, 90 workers, and one European). Ordered by British authorities to enter the El Tor quarantine station in Sinai, a vast establishment dedicated to screening Muslim pilgrims en route to and from Mecca, the entire ship’s compliment was evacuated. Departing El Tor on 18 June for Marseilles via Bizerte in Tunisia no more cholera cases were detected, but beri beri then began to strike down the survivors. The diet of rice was reinforced with bread and fresh vegetables in an effort to control the affliction. Arriving in Marseilles on 9 July, the total deaths since departure from Saigon numbered 129, a terrible attrition by any count. Besides ‘disillusionment’, the French also detected serious ‘demoralisation’ among the soldier-workers (SHD 26 N 874/12 Journal de Marches et Operations de 13th Batallon de Tirailleurs). Adding to the risk, certain ships were also torpedoed (Hill 2006, p. 260). Reading between the lines, the differential rates of mortality between workers and soldiers only makes sense in consideration of different standards of diet and accommodation. Yet it is also clear that both groups were starved of fresh food just as conditions on all ships for all but the European officer class, were spartan, unsanitary, and ‘dangerous’.

**First Combat**

According to Rives (2013), the first Indochinese to see conflict in the war were crew members of the *Mousquet*, part of a French naval group which, on 29 October 1914 squared off against the German cruiser *Emden* in the Melaka Straits. The three Vietnamese who died in this sea battle can thus be counted as the first victims of the Great War from Indochina. In January 1915, the Minister of Colonies, Gaston Doumergue, wrote to his colleague (Minister of War) Alexandre Milleraud that ‘the loyalty of the subjects of the Union would be strengthened if we admit [them] to compete for military operations currently being conducted’. Accordingly, Paris demanded the dispatch of Vietnamese mechanics and lacquer workers to treat the wings of airplanes, with the first arriving in Pau on 28 March 1915 (Rives 2013). The French high command then requested the dispatch of 35–40,000 men. Accordingly, on 7 October 1915 Paris authorised the participation of ‘Indochinese’ military formations in the conflict. By that stage, 4,631 indigenous workers had already been sent to France. Governor General Ernest Roume (April 1915–May 1916) then authorised the departure of the first two battalions made up of career elements. On 21 October, 213 tirailleurs of the 1st BTI boarded the *SS Magellan*, bound for France; the remainder following on the *Mossol* (Rives 2013). Still, it would not be until early 1916 before the Indochinese battalions actually arrived in France, entering the war at a crucial stage. While avoiding certain of the earlier murderous trench warfare episodes on the Western front — although not entirely — they also bore the full brunt of German aerial bombing as it became more refined.

**Worker or Service Troops**

More generally, Indochina was considered by the French General Staff as primarily a reservoir of labour as opposed to a source of combatants. Accordingly, the great majority of the Indochinese battalions (*bataillons d’étapes*), fifteen in all, comprised Service Troops. Certain were pressed into difficult and unsafe employment such as in gunpowder and munitions factories. As Rives (2013) explains, viewed as more docile than European workers, the Indochinese were used as ‘guinea pigs’ in the Taylor system established in these institutions. On the other hand, French unionists considered them unworthy as full-fledged workers because they refused to go on strike and willingly worked overtime to collect premiums. For instance, in the Bergerac munitions plant, they contributed 70 per cent of production while representing only 50 per cent of the workforce. Mingled with local fellow civilian workers, they maintained cordial even affectionate relations with female staff. They also proved to be skilled mechanics in both the aviation plants and railway workshops (Rives 2013).

As revealed by the *Journal des Marches*, the workers entered separate camps pending assignment to a variety of government departments as with forestry, agriculture, public works and, especially, munitions factories. Many of these work detachments were outside the war zone. Still others were given specialist training as ‘motorists’ or as telephonists, pending placement. In fact, large numbers of workers served as railroad workers building or repairing vital rail or road links in the war zone. Other Service Units maintained lines of communication, such as with the 3rd and 9th Companies of the 9th BTI transformed into the 53rd and 54th Batteries, charged with building railway lines. Surviving postcards, such as published in Rives and Deroo (1999), offer graphic images of Vietnamese soldier workers arriving in Marseilles, staging at parade grounds, under instruction, at work, being conveyed to the front, and even deployed in the trenches.

For example, the 1266-strong 14th Battalion, raised in Tonkin, and arriving in Marseilles on 5 October 1915, spent most of the war (until 16 December 1917) employed in the *Poudrerie Nationale de Saint-Médard*, or gunpowder works located near Bordeaux (*Journal de Marché* 26 N 874 14). An establishment dating back to the reign of Louis XIV, the atmosphere was intimidating just as the health risks were high. Short on detail, the incidence of hospitalisation nevertheless appears high in the banal official account, while other evidence suggests that powder and munitions plants were operated under the most severe and deleterious work conditions. Whatever else, the transition from farm to factory was telescoped for these peasant-workers. But it is also true that the instant making of a Vietnamese
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The Combat Battalions

The experience of the 7th (Tonkinese Rifle) Battalion was entirely various. Formally created on 16 February 1916 at Sept Pagodes, a river town in Hai Duong province in the mid-Red River delta of northern Vietnam – the major source of conscript labour for mines and plantations both inside Vietnam and in the colonies – the 1,000 strong 'volunteers' battalion sailed for Marseilles on 5 October. Once in France the battalion made an obligatory stage at Fréjus, prior to leaving direct for the Western Front on 4 April 1917. Within ten days they were in place poised to launch attacks on German positions, literally to kill or to be killed. According to an internal French military memorandum, from 27 May until 30 July 1917, the 7th Battalion deployed in the Vosges sector successfully held their ground without taking a break at their resistance camps of Sulzern-Eck, Goutte Morel and Linge. As the report minced, 'Great satisfaction in the manner in which they comported themselves both from the point of view of attitude towards the enemy and point of view of discipline' (Journal de Marche 26 N 87/4/5). The Journal de Marche offers no details but Linge in the Vosges mountains in Alsace on the France-German border, was the site of murderous trench warfare reaching a suicidal intensity in 1915 with both sides squared off at close proximity across an elaborate labyrinth of trenches and stone strong points.

Notoriously the war of attrition in the World War I trenches and battlefields brought about a great sense of unease in France. Social unrest was on the rise as a result of both the length and the brutality of the war (Duinker 2000, p. 54). In December 1915, antwar protests even reached the French parliament. But, by 1917, heavy loss of life and economic crisis led to defections of French soldiers along with worker strikes, injecting an element of
contention into the conduct of the war as much social attitudes. While it remains unclear if the Vietnamese actively participated in these military mutinies, as discussed below, they began to participate in the labour movement (Hill 2006, pp. 274–75).

Entering a long stalemate in 1917–18, the balance on the Western Front only began to shift with the entry of American forces in the sector following the American declaration of war against Germany on 6 April 1917. Certain Indochinese battalions would also come under the wing of the Americans, as with the 12th Battalion formed in February 1916 in northern Vietnam. Facing down enemy bombardments at Chalons sur Marne (Champagne) in March 1918, where they labored on a railway line, the 1st Company earned a special citation for bravery. Meantime, the 2nd Company were placed at the disposal of the Franco-American Mission, as with building the American hospital and, on 10 August 1918, engaging with the Génie Américain engineering brigade as with rail work at Nevers in the Loire valley down until the end of hostilities.

The Balkans Campaign

In October 1915 a combined Franco-British force landed at Salonika (Thessalonika), present-day Greece with the objective of defending Serbia against Austro-Hungarian invasion as well as drawing the line against Bulgarian aggression. Part of a broader Balkans war, the conflict pitted the French, British, Italians and Russians against the Austro-Hungarian enemy, backed by Germany and Bulgaria. Romania entered the war on the side of the Allies in 1915 and Greece in 1917. From late 1916, the Indochinese 1st Battalion would join the French expeditionary forces alongside other colonial forces as with those drawn from Senegal and Madagascar.

Some writers such as Dutton (1979, p. 97), have tried to explain the paradox of the French position in operating on two fronts, the vital Western Front versus the Balkans, where military activity was limited and with the campaign enduring over three long years, even when the Germans were in striking distance of Paris. Small solace for the participants or victims, as Dutton found, French enthusiasm for the ‘largely abortive’ Macedonian campaign – only triumphant in the last stages of the war – actually lies with French domestic politics and parliamentary debates rather than strict military contingencies.

Two of the four Indochinese combat battalions were sent direct to the broad Balkans theatre. One was the 10th Bataillon de Tirailleurs (Tonkin Rifles) which left Hongay port on the Gulf of Tonkin on 14 July 1916, and staged at Varna on the Bulgarian Black Sea coast on 15 October 1916 en route to Constantinople. Unfortunately, this campaign is not well documented. The other was the 902-strong 1st Indochinese (Tonkin Rifles) Battalion, the exploits of which I will describe in some detail, especially as standard accounts of the Vietnamese in World War I have ignored the Balkans episode, just as their historic role has tended to be folded into French military exploits.

Raised in Bac Ninh in the impoverished and overcrowded lower Red River delta, the 1st Indochinese (Tonkin Rifles) Battalion embarked Haiphong on 17 January 1916. Staging in Djibouti, they were divided into four companies each comprising some 226 tirailleurs. Additionally, a group of 32 were formed into a machine gun section. On 28 April, they embarked Djibouti with the goal of joining the Armée Français d’Orient (French Eastern Army). On 6 May they arrived in the British bastion of Salonika.

Initially charged with static ‘guard and defense’ duties in and around the Salonika camps, they were subsequently deployed with a view to securing the road connecting with Monastir (Bitola) in south Serbia, deemed a key strategic corridor in the campaign. From 3 August 1916, the 1st Indochinese battalion began to enter the Macedonian theater joining Senegalese and Malagasy forces already in place. Between August–September 1916, they then began to deploy in the lower Vardar River area in Macedonia, staging at Kozani (northern Greece) between January–June 1917, inter alia, guarding trains and marketplaces, protecting convoys, and guarding prisoners, such as at Trikali-Kalabaka (southwest of Thessalonika) (July 1917). On 30 August 1917, they suffered the first casualty following an enemy bombing of a railway station (Journal de March 26 N 874/1).

The disposition of the forces changed on 17 September 1917 with the battalion placed at the command of the French Eastern Army. They were then redeployed into mountainous southwest Macedonia and adjacent areas in Albania, specifically around Lake Ochrida (Ohrid). They now entered the battlefront. Notably, on 14 October, the 4th Company coming under enemy grenade and aerial attacks lost one rifleman, with one wounded, and 12 ‘disappeared’. On the offensive at Pogradac (southeast Albania) on 19 October 1917, they also took casualties (with five tirailleurs killed, another 15 wounded). ‘The offensive continued’ with the battalion occupying the heights of Lake Ochrida and controlling the road to Pogradac. On 22 October 1917 under constant pressure and taking losses, owing to ‘extreme fatigue’ the 4th company were relieved by the 1st company. Coming under a massive enemy attack, they took more casualties from grenade attacks, suggesting close range fighting. Constantly bivouacking through this campaign, on 25 October both companies were withdrawn from active combat to focus upon road building activities, although the roads also became targets of enemy bombing (Journal de March 26 N 874/1). Although seasonal or health conditions are not mentioned in the Journal de Marche account, we may assume that this was also a tactical retreat made necessary by a punishing winter with snow covering the higher elevations and peaks.

In early July 1918, the campaign entered a new phase with the Battalion now engaging offensive actions against Austrian positions. On 10 July, a
reconnaissance of Austrian positions revealed that the enemy had withdrawn in the direction of Bulgaria (Journal de March 26 N 874/1). The general enemy retreat in Albania was actually confirmed in near real time reporting by the New York Times under such banner headlines as, ‘Foe Forced from Tomonica Valley and Austrian Attacks Fail: Bulgars also Menaced’, and ‘Vienna admits retreat in Albania’ (New York Times, 10–11 July 1918).

Still, that was not the end of the war. Meanwhile, the second and third companies took up front line positions in the general vicinity of Porocani (Albania), at high elevation. On 31 July 1918, the first companies faced down a ‘violent Austrian attack’ on the Porocani front. At the cost of one tirailleur, they successfully repulsed the Austrian force and maintained their ground. But in August 1918, the battalion also began to take casualties in the face of ‘violent bombardments’ by Austrian forces, and with the enemy continuing to infiltrate their positions. ‘Violently attacked’, the first and the third companies held them in check. Still, the conflict raged through August, now joined by Bulgarian forces, including two waves of attacks launched in August, both repulsed. At this time (25 August), a retreat by the Italians in the Tomorica and Devoli valleys weakened French lines (Journal de March 26 N 874/1). But the Bulgarians were also crumbling (New York Times, 11 July 1918).

While this brief account elides the broader geopolitical issues at play in the Balkans, by 31 October 1918, French and Italian forces had expelled the Austro–Hungarian Army from Albania. At war end (the Armistice went into effect on 11 November 1918), having endured two winters in the course of this punishing campaign, the brigade returned to Salonika, arriving on 11 January 1919. Now assigned to various logistics duties, the 1st Battalion staged at Fiume (present-day Croatia), Zagreb, and Belgrade, before departing on 25 March for France and home (Journal de March 26 N 874/1). To the extent that the French Eastern Army facilitated an ultimate Serbian victory, then the Indochinese battalion undoubtedly played its part. Indeed, holding the line against the Austrians and pushing back the Bulgarians, may even have been singularly important. It is hard to know.

In this theatre, according to Rives (2011), figures also corresponding to my reading, 23 tirailleurs were killed, 41 wounded, and with 10 disappeared. Among them would have been the loss of one tirailleur and five wounded as the result of grenade accident on 10 June 1918 (Journal de March 26 N 874/1). The sparse and terse Journal de Marche report offers no accolades, just as the herocis of the 1st Battalion were forgotten.

No overall casualty figures for the Indochinese in World War I service are offered in the Journal de Marches but, alongside France (with a 30 percent casualty rate) and other belligerents, the Indochinese battalions undoubtedly suffered less. But morale can never have been far from French thinking and doubtless the risk of defection outweighed the benefit of pushing colonial forces to the limit (although that also happened as well). According to Blanc (2005, p. 1160), it is impossible to say with accuracy how many were killed, although many war cemeteries around Marseilles offer eloquent testimony to the attrition of lives, workers included.

Nationalist Response to Wartime Conscription

Of the latter Nguyen dynasty emperors of Vietnam, one stands out in modern Vietnamese history today for his patriotism, namely the boy-king Duy Tan, born on 14 August 1899 to Emperor Thanh Thai (r.1889–1907) as Prince Nguyen Vinh San. In this narrative, as Vietnamese historian Nguyen Khac Vien, (1975, pp. 2–17; pp. 22–25) embellishes, with his father removed from office ostensibly for insanity, the prince took his place on the Golden Dragon Throne in 1907 at the age of seven, assuming the reign name Duy Tan, or ‘friend of reforms’. Chosen for his youth, naive, and pliability, Duy Tan (r. 1907–16), however, proved to be as obstinate as his father before him. Ostensibly Francophile, the young king Duy Tan nevertheless opposed the excessive aspects of French rule and called for a revision of the 1884 Protectorate Treaty. Against the background of local indignation at conscription for France’s wars in Europe, Duy Tan acting on the counsel of ‘patriot mandarins’, notably, Thai Phien and Tran Cao Van, organised a revolt on behalf of troops about to be sent to France. Timed for 3 May 1916, the secret was discovered, the French disarmed the soldiers, and Duy Tan was detained, dethroned, and exiled, joining his father the ‘mad king’ in the remote French Indian Ocean colony of La Réunion. The two concerned mandarins were executed amidst a wave of repression.

It is of no small interest that on 3 May 1917 the 16th BTI battalion which, as mentioned, took casualties on the Froissy-Somme front, was visited by a high ranking northern Vietnamese mandarin or imperial delegate, both talking up the kingdom of Annam and the cause of France against the ‘barbarians’. Commended in French dispatches for making a good impression on the troops, the mandarin also suggested a distribution of croix de guerre to the heroes of the bombardment. As the French military authority commented upon events back in Hue, the battalion was the first to be created in the wake of the deposition of the boy-king Duy Tan, exiled to Réunion, for ‘treachery’ (or, actually, for falling in with the anti-French party). Duy Tan’s successor, as the imperial delegate observed, had swung the authority of the court and mandarins in support of the French cause. Notwithstanding the solicitations of the revolutionary party, as with distributing arms days before the events in question – the defection of the boy-king – the tirailleurs were to be commended for not participating in any anti-dynastic or anti-French movement, thus confirming their patriotism. Hence, in this narrative, the exemplary discipline of the battalion in facing down the enemy bombing was to be especially commended. This of course
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was pure cant. Obviously, if the emperor defected from the French cause, then the game of winning over the masses to voluntary conscription was a charade. But French morale was also low. In May 1917, French veterans of the Battle of Verdun, mutinied, just as France lost more casualties relative to its population than any other power on the side of the Allies.

The 1916 Cambodian Revolt

In 1916, a revolt dubbed by the French – the 1916 affair – brought tens of thousands of peasants to Phnom Penh to petition King Sisowath for a reduction in taxes. Since 1912, a large-scale road building programme had been launched involving the mobilisation of considerable numbers of corvée labourers. As Forest (1980, p. 67) points out, such conscription was poorly received by the peasantry. At the epicentre of the rebellion in Kampong Cham, some 100,000 peasants rose up prior to a march upon the capital. Official opinion was divided as to the cause of the rebellion, whether a purely domestic affair stemming from discontent with the tax system along with official abuse, or as being manipulated by external actors. As Tully (2005, pp. 96–99) summarises, resentment at military recruitment for France’s war in Europe along with long-standing resentment over rising tax and corvée requirements contrived to push ordinary people to rebellion. The event ended tragically with the ‘autocratic’ Resident Superior Baudoin ordering a violent crackdown leading to the death of an indeterminate numbers of protestors.

In Cambodia, the war also opened a breach between contending members of the royal family. One of his trips to Europe in August–September 1900, Prince Norodom Yukanthor (1860–1934), an heir presumptive to the Cambodian throne, criticised French rule in Cambodia (Osborne 1969: pp. 244–45). Having been exiled from Cambodia for ‘acts of disobedience’, Yukanthor then based himself in Thailand after having created an opposition movement in his favour. According to an official French source, Yukanthor was also involved in secret acts against the protectorate and the royal government during World War I (AOM Inde NF/48/585), code for dalliance with the Germans.

Vietnamese Nationalist Response

The notion that making contacts with France’s enemy might help the anti-colonial cause was not lost upon certain Vietnamese nationalists. Confucian literati and leader of the Look East movement (to Japan), Phan Boi Chau was one. First making contact with potentially sympathetic German consulate officials in Hong Kong in 1906, again in 1910 he looked to Berlin for sources of funding for his activities (Marr 1971, p. 127; p. 151). He may also have influenced Prince Cuong De, a renegade scion of the royal family of Hue and a follower of Chau who visited Germany in 1913 more or less banking upon a German victory (Tran My-Van 2005, p. 97).

Other nationalists as with Nguyen Thuong Hien, appealed in print for his countrymen to refuse conscription. He also received seed money from the German and Austrian consulates in Bangkok in support of armed rebellions against the French border posts, although easily quashed by the French. Nevertheless, the numerous revolts and coups inside Vietnam continuing through World War I demonstrated, according to (Marr 1971, pp. 228–29), an absence of support for France in its war with Germany.

Political Backlash

We should not ignore the radicalisation process experienced by sections of the worker-soldiers in metropolitan France. It is notable that, of the immigrants arriving in 1915, the majority were illiterate (23,234 out of 34,715). But, as Brocheux points out, the literates would emerge as the ‘ideologues’, the animators of the independence movement alongside such auxiliaries as those serving communication networks (restaurateurs), liaison persons, and propagandists (sailors, workers, house boys, and sometimes, soldiers) (Brocheux 2012).

Arriving in Paris from London in late 1919, where he may well have been awaiting the end of conscription for France’s war (Duiker 2000, p. 34), the young Ho Chi Minh registered his opposition to conscription in what is signaled as his first extant writings. Appearing in the French Socialist Party newspaper, L’Humanité, published in Paris on 4 November 1920 under the signature, Nguyen Ai Quoc, he wrote, ‘We oppose sending Annamese soldiers to Syria. We must make the highest authorities understand that many of our ill-fated oriental brothers were killed in battles between 1914 and 1918 during a war for “culture and justice”. “Why, then, do we not have culture and justice?”’ (cited in Borton 2010, p. 38). As Ho Chi Minh decisively shifted his allegiance away from the Second International to Third International concerns (Congress de Tours), especially around the colonial question, he also came to rationalise World War I as an ‘imperialist war’, with colonial rivalry as one of its causes (Ho Chi Minh, La Vie Ouvrière, 7 September 1923 cited in Fall 1967, p. 34).

From London, Ho Chi Minh had been in letter contact with another Vietnamese who made the voyage to France during the war years. This was Phan Chu Trinh (1872–1926), also known as Phan Chau Trinh, a pioneer nationalist figure alongside Phan Boi Chau in seeking an end to France’s occupation. Calling for the abolition of the monarchy and its replacement with a democratic republic, he then went to Japan with Phan Boi Chau. Back in Vietnam in 1907, after peasant tax revolts erupted in 1908, he was arrested. Sentenced to death, but commuted to life imprisonment, in 1911 he was pardoned and deported to France. From Paris in 1915, he sought
to win the support of progressive French politicians and Vietnamese exiles. According to Vinh Sinh (2009, p. xiii), when Germany attacked France, Chau refused to be conscripted for French military service. He was duly arrested and spent 10 months in Santé prison in Paris (September 1914–July 1915) on suspicion of asking Germany for help to fight against France. Together, Phan Chau Trinh, radical lawyer Phan Van Truong, and Ho Chi Minh (Nguyen Ai Quoc) drafted the set of demands, as presented by Ho on 18 June 1919 at the Versailles Peace Conference. These included a complete amnesty for Indochinese political prisoners, and reform of the justice system (Vinh Sinh 2009, p. xvii).

**The Paris-Based Foyer Indochinois**

The end of the war and the demobilisation of workers only signaled a new problem for the French authorities, namely one of community control, especially as the numbers of Vietnamese resident in France grew, as did their political engagements. As Duiker (2000, p. 56) remarks, of the 50,000 odd Vietnamese remaining in France at the end of the war, a few hundred had already arrived to study, mainly the children of wealthy families. As such, they entered a highly politicised atmosphere, especially as the French capital still upheld its intellectual and political pretensions as a cultural hub of the Western world.

Essentially the authorities looked to guide these individuals not only towards French culture but away from subversive activities. In large part, the authorities took up the challenge by monitoring student and other Vietnamese circles throughout France. The dossiers are huge just as the spying and surveillance exercise must have consumed considerable resources and ingenuity. But on 26 November 1920, with the approval of the minister of colonies and with the special support of the minister of interior and former Governor General of Indochina, Albert Sarraut, the authorities pressed ahead with the creation of an Association Mutuelle de Indochine also dubbed the Foyer Indochinois. Furnished with premises at 15 Rue de Sommerand, vested with an annual subvention of 50,000 francs, and under the directorship of a former Vietnamese member of the colonial council, the medical doctor, Le Quan, the Foyer went about its professed mission of, inter alia, socialising its members into French culture, doling out social welfare assistance, and keeping up links with their homeland (AOM SLOTFOM III 40, ‘Association Mutuelle de Indochine’).

By 1926, however, as an even newer generation of Vietnamese arrived in Paris, the conservative leadership of the Foyer dominated by the ‘constitutionalists’ (the Parti Constitutionnal Indochinois which attracted a student membership), came under challenge. By this juncture, Vietnamese organisations active in Paris also included the Annam Independence Party, the Annamite Union, and the Association of Annamite Workers (active in Le Havre). On 26 February 1926, on the occasion of leadership ballot, particularly ‘violent’ scenes emerged with members of the ‘bloc de progressistes’, shouting nationalist and communist slogans, including the words ‘Vive l’indépendance de l’Indochine’. In elections on 2 May, the constitutionalists lost ground to the progressive bloc. In elections on 31 October the progressives strengthened their hand winning 110 votes out of 130. This success was made possible through the recruitment of a new membership largely comprising Vietnamese cuisiniers (cooks) working in Paris. Behind them stood former Nguyen Ai Quoc associate, Nguyen The Truyen, founder of the Annam Independence Party and editor of three left-wing newspapers, Viet-Nam-Hoc; Phuc-Quoc and l’Arme Annamite. Nguyen The Truyen was also the force behind an Association des Travailleurs Manuelle (or manual workers’ association), which had hitherto avoided political issues. As described by a judicial inquiry into the election ‘fasco’, the association comprised 150 members, for the most part ‘communist cooks’, members of the radical ‘Association des Cuisiniers’, or cooks’ association, along with Bolshevik students, led by the anti-French Vietnamese Nguyen The Truyen. As the head of the Sûreté Générale or political police then advised, ‘It seems that the moment has come in Indochina to suppress the liberalities accorded such groups which, one after the other, fall under the influence of the Bolsheviks’. In the meantime, he advised, the Foyer should be brought back under the control of ‘healthy’ elements as with ex-Indochina bureaucrats outside of the ‘excesses’ of young extremists (AOM SLOTFOM III 40 ‘Association Mutuelle de Indochine’, Note pour le Ministre de la Police et de la Sûreté Générale en Indochine).

At the end of 1927 Nguyen The Truyen returned to Vietnam traveling up the coast to Hue meeting Pham Boi Chau, but breaking with the communists. Back in France during the progressive Popular Front period (1936–37), although home in Vietnam in 1938, he was arrested by the French in 1941 (Quinn-Judge 2003: pp. 329). He was not alone and one by one other France-based intellectuals (Trotskyists and ‘Stalinists’ alike) would return to Vietnam injecting a new dynamism into the anti-colonial movement, especially in the world of literature and political journalism which blossomed in Saigon, at least until the suppression of ‘liberalities’ became a reality by the end of the decade.

**Demobilisation**

According to Hill (2006, pp. 275–76), at the time of the signing of the armistice, 43,430 Vietnamese were serving in military units in France along with some 5,500 in the French army outside of France. There were then approximately 49,000 Vietnamese workers in France along with some 2,000 outside of France. The demobilisation of the battalions (as testified by the Journal de Marche et Opérations) progressed rapidly, although some 2,000 were still retained by July 1920 stationed in Germany, China, the Levant, Syria, Lebanon, Morocco and the Balkans. By contrast, the demobilisation of the
workers was delayed especially as they were pressed into reconstruction projects, although essentially completed by December 1920. Nevertheless, some 2,900 Vietnamese soldiers and workers gained permission to remain in France for work, study or marriage, literally the first Vietnamese 'immigrants' paving the way for waves of newer arrivals. Facing down discrimination they also amalgamated, as with the formation of workers' organisations. Others gravitated to French Communist Party affiliate organisations, and with certain, as with sailors, linking up the underground communist movement back home.

In 1915 a battalion of the 3rd Regiment of Tonkinese Rifles (3rd RTT) was sent to China to garrison the French concession in Shanghai. The rifle companies remaining in Indochina saw service in 1917 in putting down a mutiny of the Garde Indigène (native gendarmerie) in Thai Nguyen province in northern Vietnam. In August 1918, three companies of the Tonkinese Rifles formed part of a battalion of French Colonial Infantry sent to Siberia as part of the Allied intervention following the Russian Revolution (Rives and Deroo 1999, pp. 53–54). In the course of conflict, Indochinese units, won 11 military medals and 333 'croix de guerre' (Rives 2013). Four regiments of Tonkinese Rifles continued in existence between the two World Wars, seeing active service in Indochina, Syria (1920–21), Morocco (1925–26) and in the frontier clashes with Thailand (1940–41) (anon 1991).

**The Soldier Returnees**

As described by Rives (2013), when the Indochinese soldiers returned home, they were informed of their rights. In addition, by province, an Assistance Committee assumed responsibility for sending them parcels during the hostilities. Very soon, however, indifference or annoyance set in against the unruly 'returnees from France' as they were called. In turn, they tended to reject the traditional authorities and sought to deal directly with the colonial administration whose language they learned to speak. Certain received a share of ricefields reserved for them along the Bach Ghia canal in Thai Nguyen province, while others received a bonus that allowed them to set up as an artisan or farmer. Those demobilised from Annam and Tonkin were honored with a mandarinal grade. Those from Cochinchina were given a right of precedence in ritual ceremonies. The Cambodians were decorated with royal honors, such as with the Muniseraphon medal (Rives 2013).

Others, however, may have pursued more activist careers. In the wake of the suppression of the Nghe-Tinh peasant rebellion of 1930–31, a partly communist-inspired affair also leading to the creation of 'soviets', an official commission of inquiry collected a large number of depositions or, basically, confessions from suspects (Gunn 2014, pp. 94–95). Taking the declaration of one peasant-cultivator cum soldier returnee from France, Bui Hat, as emblematic, the judicial official asked, 'Why did you join the communist party?' To which he answered, 'It took me by surprise. It happened that I was forced to join the communist party.' 'What is communism?', he was asked and to which he replied, 'I deny having been a communist. I spent several years in the military infirmary. I spent three years at Fréjus after the war' (AOM Indochine NF/334/2689 'Commission d’enquête sur les événements du Nord Annam', 9 July 1931).

**Ton Duc Thang**

The most celebrated returnee, at least in Vietnamese communist historiography, was undoubtedly future Democratic Republic of Vietnam president Ton Duc Thang (1888–1980) who, upon return to Vietnam from France in 1920 formed the Association of Workers of the Saigon Arsenal. Setting aside disagreements over Ton Duc Thang's involvement with a Saigon labour union in the 1920s and the naval-yard strike there in 1925, Giebel (2004, pp. 13–14) questions whether he participated in a mutiny on a French ship sent to the Black Sea in 1919 to help defeat Bolsheviks. Shipping rosters and naval records reveal he was not on any of the ships on which the most decisive revolts broke out, and also did not participate in any of the core revolts on the Black Sea in 1919. Nevertheless, as Giebel (2004, p. 24) allows, having heard stories of the Black Sea mutinies while serving as a French conscript in Toulon, the future president was involved in the mass protests in southern France.

Postwar, the first major defection from within the colonial army ranks occurred in the northwest of Vietnam. On 9 February 1930, part of the 4th Regiment of Tonkinese Rifles stationed at Yen Bai mutinied against their French officers. Led by the major non-communist political party, the Kuomintang-modelled VQGĐĐ or nationalistic party, the Yen Bai mutiny, obviously premature, was not only doomed but virtually eliminated with the leadership collectively executed. Other rifle companies eventually defected from the French cause in the mid-1940s, lending crucial support to the then embryonic Viet Minh (Gunn 2014, pp. 61–63). But it is another matter to suggest that their actions were a result of distantly remembered World War I experiences, especially as other rifle companies remained loyal.

It is hard to trace the career tracks of Cambodian soldier returnees, but certain were at the vanguard of future social movements, especially as their loyalties were tugged by nationalists and other demagogues, just as their eyes were awoken by experiences—shipborne and in battle—few at home could have imagined. One who did play a key future role in the development of modern Cambodian nationalism was Pach Chhoeun, a former interpreter for the troops. Another who had fought for France was Khim Tit. Joining the colonial service during the Pacific War, he took his place in the Japanese-sponsored cabinet, later becoming a governor of Kampot.
province. A pro-monarchist but also a pro-independence politician, he also played a cameo role at the end of the war (Kiernan 1985, pp. 20–21).

**Summing Up**

From the above it is clear that there was no straight line evolution of thinking on the part of the near 100,000 Vietnamese worker-soldiers serving in France and other World War I theaters and the iniquities of imperialist war or, for that matter, even the paradox of dying for France, while Vietnam remained enslaved. In fact, the majority of soldiers were cocooned from politicisation and, for the survivors, double-talk to be alive and to receive their hard won wages and pension packages. Not so the workers who were more closely exposed to the realities of grinding munitions factory, and agricultural work and, doubtless, discrimination. Certain, as with those exposed to the French labour movement, were easily mobilised. Although this essay has focused upon the soldier’s actual experiences, we have also noted the role of the ‘communist cooks’ in Paris in the early postwar period. But others, especially lacquer workers employed in the aircraft industry, were also radicalised and unionised.

As revealed by the Indochina Foyer story, the real struggle for the French in both France and in Indochina, was for the hearts and minds of the young intellectuals torn between collaboration with the French project and those, as with the young Nguyen Ai Quoc/Ho Chi Minh, who intellectualised Indochina’s predicament as one of colonial subjugation in the vice of imperialist war, and looked to international solidarity, accordingly. Ultimately, it would be the intellectuals including the France-trained returnees who would galvanise the anti-colonial movement.

Denied credible prior knowledge of the horrors of the Western Front, and pumped up by false loyalty to France, plus inducements, the mostly illiterate peasants from the poverty stricken and famine-prone provinces of the Red River Delta and north-central Vietnam made ready recruits, even short of coercion. To be sure, as Brocheux (2012) has commented, France invoked the same patriotic call for men and resources during World War II. In 1939, Minister of Colonies Georges. Mandel called upon 80,000 Indochinese. In June 1940 at the time of the French capitulation to Germany there were 28,000 (8,000 infantry and 20,000 non specialised workers) on French soil.

More generally, the tombs of fallen Indochinese soldiers, such as those of the Douaumont ossuary in northeastern France and at sites in Albania, attest to sacrifices made during the Great War (Rives 2013). The same can be said of Fréjus, site of the military camp for forces arriving from Indochina, where a pagoda, an Indochina war memorial-memorial, and a marine museum recall this link with the past but only for those ’mort pour la France’ or who ‘died for France’.

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Geoffrey C Gunn is Emeritus Professor, Faculty of Economics, Nagasaki University.